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Chapter Three: Political Socialisation – Learning about politics. 
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Consider this: In 2015 soccer fans of the Hong Kong team booed the Chinese national 
anthem at a match. In response, in 2017 the Chinese government introduced new legislation 
which outlined the harsh sanctions, including prison, it would impose for any malevolent 
revisions to the lyrics or disparaging performances of China’s national anthem, or otherwise 
any other ways in which the national anthem could be perceived to be disrespected. The 
Chinese government have argued that the law will help foster social values and promote 
patriotism. This raises several significant questions about the individual and their 
relationship to the larger social whole. How do we become accustomed to the political norms 
and values of a country? How far can the state go in socializing individuals into the values, 
norms and symbols of the country? When does learning and being told to respect the national 
anthem move from instilling pride in people to outright indoctrination?  
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3.1 Introduction 
  
The above example of the Chinese national anthem law leads us to begin thinking about 
political learning and about the mechanisms and processes of how the individual learns about 
politics. How do we learn about the norms and values which constitute the political life in 
which we live? What are the origins of our political views? And when do we learn about 
politics? At first sight these questions might seem quite banal. There are a fairly predictable 
range of sources from which we learn about the political world: families, newspapers, the 
Internet, formal education, direct political participation and so on. However, the question of 
how people learn about politics is far from simple. First of all, how we learn about politics 
depends upon what we understand as politics. As we saw in the introduction, what constitutes 
politics is a complex question. It is not just limited to possessing knowledge about the 
particular forms of government and institutions of a particular nation or sets of nations. 
Politics also concerns the values and attitudes we hold both individually and as part of a 
larger social whole. Such values and attitudes also shape our interaction with the broader 
political community (not just political institutions, but civil society too) and our 
understanding of the nature and relations of power. Therefore, how we learn about politics is 
fundamental to our orientation as individuals within a broader political system and the 
relations of power which underpin that system.  
  
Secondly, as we noted above, while there are obvious social agents for our political 
learning (e.g. family, school, media etc.), it is important to understand that if we observe 
politics as being in its broadest sense about relations of power, then there are also less 
apparent social agents which inform the political values we hold. For example, popular 
culture, especially in the era of global digital media where we can access culture, global news 
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and ideas from a swipe of a smart phone, can play a fundamental role in shaping our view of 
politics. Likewise, specific contingent events such as 9-11 or the United Kingdom’s 
referendum vote to leave the European Union can influence our view of politics and the 
frequency and intensity of our political participation.  
 
What we learn about politics, how we learn it, and from whom, also depends on the wider 
social and political context within which political learning takes place. Political learning in 
the early 21st Century takes place in very different circumstances to those in the mid-20th 
Century. Moreover, the shape, type and outcome of political learning is contingent upon the 
type of political system an individual is being socialised into. Political learning takes a 
different form in Western liberal democratic political systems than it does in say autocratic 
systems in the post-Soviet space or in the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. To further 
complicate matters, political learning can take place in a dynamic environment. People may 
become politically socialised in one type of system and then through a process of social 
change find themselves having to adapt and learn the values and norms of a new type of 
political system. This was the situation faced by people who had grown up in the communist 
states of Central and Eastern Europe but then, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, found 
themselves having to adapt to the norms and values of a democratic system.  
 
There is also the question of when people learn about politics. This is a question which 
has incited a great deal of debate in the study of political socialisation. On the one hand, there 
are those who emphasise the importance of early-life, pre-adult experiences, and see families 
and education as the prominent social agents in shaping political views. On the other hand, 
there are those who argue that the process of learning about politics is influenced decisively 
by the various experiences throughout our lives which changes our circumstances and 
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outlook on the world. 
 
 Finally, there is the question of why political socialisation is important? The study of 
political socialisation is important because it has attempted to produce generalizable findings 
which can inform us about political behaviour. It can also tell us about the potential long-term 
impact of political learning on political culture and political participation in democratic 
systems. Similarly, understanding political learning can shape our understanding of stability 
and change in non-democratic systems too. 
 
This chapter will unpack these issues which underpin how political scientists have sought 
to come to terms with the question of the acquisition of political knowledge and political 
views. Including a chapter on political socialisation at the beginning of this book was a 
deliberate decision. After all, we could have started with a discussion of political institutions 
or with an analysis of the main strands in political thought over the centuries. To start with 
the issue of learning about politics, or political socialisation, gives you a chance to reflect 
upon your own socialisation, your own political views and your own experience of politics. 
Moreover, it may also help to reinforce the points made in the Introduction about how 
political phenomena do not necessarily confine themselves to the world of governments, 
parliaments and political parties. 
 
3.2 What is Political Socialisation? 
As individuals we do not engage with the political and social world as fully formed rational 
conscious adults. We are not born with an innate sense of the political world. Thus, as 
Michael Rush puts it: 
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Political socialisation may be defined as the process by which individuals in a given 
society become acquainted with the political system and which to a certain degree 
determines their perceptions and their reactions to political phenomena. 
(Rush 1992: 92) 
Broadly put, political socialisation concerns how we as individuals develop basic sets of 
political skills, attitudes, orientations and practices. This broad definition could be further 
disaggregated into two components: political socialisation at the macro and micro levels. As 
Virginia Sapiro argues: 
 
At the macro level, political socialisation frames research on how polities and other 
political societies and systems inculcate appropriate norms and practices in citizens, 
residents or members. At the micro level, political socialisation frames research on the 
patterns and processes by which individuals engaging in political development and 
learning, constructing their particular relationships to the political contexts in which they 
live.  
                        (Sapiro 2004: 2-3) 
 
Differently put, as a macro process political socialisation concerns ensuring individuals are 
instructed in the necessary values and attitudes to sustain a particular political system. As a 
micro process political socialisation relates to how political learning shapes their participation 
in, and relationship with, different forms of political activity and political agents.  
 
A number of questions emerge from defining political socialisation in this way: 
1. What is the purpose and context of political socialisation? 
2. What do we learn? 
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3. When do we become political socialised? 
4. From whom do we learn about politics? 
5. Why is political socialisation important? 
 
These five questions form the guiding thread of this chapter. 
 
3.3. What is political socialisation for? 
Through political socialisation we learn those values and norms which allow us to 
participate and play an active and productive role in society. The content of what is 
transmitted as part of the social learning process has been viewed by scholars as being 
critically important to the perpetuation of values which are consistent for the long-term 
benefit of the governing of a nation (Dennis 1968). Differently put, it can explain the 
persistence of different types of political systems as political knowledge, attitudes, norms and 
values are passed from one generation to the next (Easton and Dennis 1967). This is known 
as inter-generational transmission and can be useful in exploring the relationship between the 
values and attitudes children learn from their parents and families and their proclivity for 
political participation in adult life (Quintelier 2015).  
 
The function of political socialisation can be understood in two ways: as a benign form of 
civic education and as malign form of political indoctrination. Let’s take each of these forms 
in turn.  
 
Civic Education 
For a fully functioning democratic polity we require a politically literate citizenry. It 
echo’s Aristotle’s (384–322 BC) famous maxim in The Politics that ‘man is by nature a 
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political animal’ (Aristotle 1985: 3). By this, Aristotle meant that people, by virtue of their 
natural propensity to congregate, need to be part of a political community in order to flourish 
as human beings. It follows that since humans are political in the most basic sense of that 
term, they need to acquire political skills to take part in the most complete expression of 
human community – the state. 
 
Political socialisation, therefore, provides us with knowledge necessary to understand the 
role and importance of elections, political parties and government to the democratic process. 
It conditions us to appreciate the moral and political norms of a democratic society such as 
concepts like freedom, justice and equality, despite their contested nature. Often the 
transmission of such norms can be implicit through our daily interactions in school, with 
family and by watching the news. But democratic governments can also make an explicit 
effort to transmit political knowledge in order to socialise individuals. A good example of 
this is post-WWII West Germany. After the Second World War, the American and British 
authorities sought to ‘re-educate’ the German people who had fallen under the spell of Nazi 
totalitarianism. Through the Federal Agency for Civic Education (FACE) the post-War 
German government sought to instil a democratic culture through the teaching of ‘community 
studies’, ‘social studies’ and the so-called ‘state-citizen upbringing’ (Himmelmann 2006). 
Civic Education continued to be important for the German state especially after reunification 
of West and East Germany in 1990. There was resistance, however, from teachers and 
educators who felt that politics should be taught in a neutral fashion without exposing 
students to the ideological views of the teacher. FACE continues to play a substantial role in 
civic education in Germany as the below extract from its missions and activities taken from 
their website demonstrates. 
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Key Word:  Totalitarianism is a political system in which the state strives to maintain total 
control of the public and private space and which is characterised by dictatorship, a single 
mass party, a guiding ideology, terror and violence, monopoly of communication and a 
centrally planned economy. 
 
 
Think point 
 Why does FACE see its role as important for German society? 
 What difference can citizens possessing political knowledge make to a political 
system? 
 Can the teaching of politics and civic values ever be neutral? 
 
Germany, of course, is not the only state which offers some form of civic and political 
education and we can find some version of it in most countries in the world. For instance, 
Citizenship Studies was introduced in the United Kingdom as a part of the National 
Curriculum in 2002 by the Labour government because of concerns around political 
disengagement from the democratic process. The new subject aimed to help students ‘become 
The Federal Agency for Civic Education: Our Mission and Activities 
The Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb) provides citizenship education and 
information on political issues for all people in Germany. The bpb’s work centres on 
promoting awareness for democracy and participation in politics. The broad range of 
educational activities provided by the bpb is designed to motivate people and enable them to 
give critical thought to political and social issues and play an active part in political life. 
Considering Germany's experience with various forms of dictatorial rule the Federal Republic 
of Germany bears a unique responsibility for firmly anchoring values such as democracy, 
pluralism and tolerance in people's minds.  
Source:http://www.bpb.de/die-bpb/138853/our-mission-and-activities 
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informed, thoughtful and responsible citizens who are aware of their duties and rights’ 
(Department for Education and Skills 2005). Moreover, a great deal of research conducted on 
the topic of political socialisation in the United States in the 1960s focused on the role of the 
civic curriculum in shaping long-term political orientations. Some studies believed such 
forms of civic education was fundamental to shaping political attitudes in America (Almond 
and Verba 1963), while other studies found there was a lack of evidence that the civic 
curriculum has a significant effect on the political orientation of the great majority of 
American high school students (Langton and Jennings 1968). Nevertheless, the formal 
teaching of political knowledge has been a key function of political socialisation for new and 
established democratic systems.  
 
Political indoctrination 
To this point we have only considered political socialisation as possessing a benign 
purpose in that it allows us as individuals to become ‘good’ citizens and participate to the 
fullest extent in our democratic communities. Alternatively, we might turn this function on its 
head. We could also suggest that any regime requires mass political socialisation to ensure 
individuals possess regime friendly norms. Such acquiescence to the governing authority via 
the indoctrination of particular values can aid the maintenance of less benevolent regimes. 
This could be viewed as a more sinister and malign form of political socialisation. It is a 
process through which people are conditioned into particular kinds of behaviour. Individuals 
are moulded into specific roles and attitudes which are there to serve the political regime at 
the head of the system.  
  
 Despite claims by Francis Fukuyama (1992) that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant 
the ‘end of history’ and the victory of liberal democracy globally, the 21st Century continues 
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to be replete with examples of non-democratic regimes using political indoctrination to instil 
regime friendly values into citizens. Turkmenistan is one of the most acute examples of this 
phenomenon. Turkmenistan became an independent country when the Soviet Union 
disintegrated in 1991. The former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, 
Saparmurat Niyazov, became the country’s first president and quickly established a 
personality cult eerily familiar to the Stalinist cult of the 1930s. Niyazov’s portrait adorned 
buildings and the inside of taxi cabs and he re-named himself Turkmenbashi (Leader of all 
Turkmen). The education system also became dominated by the Niyazov-penned pseudo-
spiritual guidebook for the nation, the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul), in which it was estimated 
that half of class time in school was given over to the teaching of Niyazov’s book. Moreover, 
entry into universities in Turkmenistan was also dependent upon demonstrating knowledge of 
the Ruhnama, while potential state employees also had to pass an exam on the text in order to 
take up a position in the civil service (Bohr 2016: 42). A giant mechanical statue of the book 
was also erected in the capital Ashgabat and each evening the statute would open-up and a 
recorded passage from the book is played out on loud speakers. The book was an important 
element of a system of political indoctrination which aimed to inculcate values which would 
provide political support for Niyazov’s all-pervasive personality cult. Niyazov died in 2006, 
but his successor Gurbanguly Berdymukhemdov has followed suit in establishing a 
personality cult and system of political indoctrination.  
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The Ruhnama statute monument in Ashgabat  
 
 The case of Turkmenistan echoes the more well-known example of North Korea where it 
is compulsory for young children to join the Young Pioneer Corps at just 9 before joining the 
Socialist Youth League aged 14. Through schooling, songs and social activities children learn 
the official history of the regime and their place within it and they declare their allegiance to 
Kim Jong Un and call him 'father' (O’Brien 2014). These youth organisations and the 
educational role they perform ensure that generation after generation of young recruits are 
instilled with the values which ensure that they are good and loyal citizens to the North 
Korean Regime.  
 
It is very difficult to both quantify and qualify any correlation between political 
indoctrination and support for a non-democratic regime. Often scholars assume that non-
democratic regimes are relatively stable, perhaps because mechanisms such as youth political 
socialisation ensure a steady replacement of generational support for the regime. Thus, 
observers are often taken by surprise when non-democratic regimes suddenly collapse 
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without what seems any prior warning as was the case with the fall of the communist regime 
in the USSR and the fall of governments in the Arab world in 2010-11 (in Tunisia, Libya and 
Egypt). However, it would be short-sighted to think that the pro-regime support cultivated via 
political indoctrination disappears over-night. In recent decades where non-democratic 
regimes have been over-turned by popular revolt such as the Arab Spring or through external 
invasion (such as in Iraq), democratic gains have been quickly reversed. For instance, the 
military returned to power in Egypt in a coup in 2013, while it is believed that many of 
Saddum Hussein's former military officers and spies are leading ISIS in both Iraq and Syria 
(Sly 2015).  
 
Both Turkmenistan and North Korea are recent examples of political socialisation as form 
of indoctrination which have taken their cues from the totalitarian regimes of the 20th 
Century, most obviously that of the Soviet Union. When Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik 
Party seized power in Russia in October 1917 they only amounted to a few thousand workers 
and party professionals. Yet, they were attempting to govern an imperial population of 170 
million. Given the Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli reminds us that that the 
maintenance of power emerges from a balancing act between cruelty and clemency and 
liberality and meanness (Machiavelli 1961), Lenin and the Bolsheviks needed to use a 
mechanism other than violence and coercion to preserve power. They were able to achieve 
this through dedicated political education (or re-education) and indoctrination to the values of 
communism. The excerpt of a speech delivered by Lenin in 1920 demonstrates the 
importance of political education to the revolutionary cause in Russia. 
 
V. I. Lenin Speech Delivered at An All-Russia Conference of Political Education 
Workers of Gubernia and Uyezd Education Departments, November 3, 1920 
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In all bourgeois states the connection between the political apparatus and education is very 
strong, although bourgeois society cannot frankly acknowledge it. Nevertheless, this society 
indoctrinates the masses through the church and the institution of private property. It is one of 
our basic tasks to contrapose our own truth to bourgeois “truth” and win its recognition…. 
Education workers, and the Communist Party as the vanguard in the struggle, should consider 
it their fundamental task to help enlighten and instruct the working masses, in order to cast 
off the old ways and habituated routine we have inherited from the old system, the private 
property habits the masses are thoroughly imbued with. This fundamental task of the entire 
socialist revolution should never be neglected during consideration of the particular problems 
that have demanded so much attention from the Party’s Central Committee and the Council 
of People’s Commissars. What kind of structure should the Chief Committee for Political 
Education have? How should it be linked up with other institutions? How should it be linked 
up, not only with the centre but with local bodies? These questions will be answered by 
comrades who are more competent in the matter, have already gained considerable 
experience, and have made a special study of the matter. I would like merely to stress the 
main principles involved. We must put the matter frankly and openly affirm, despite all the 
old untruths, that education cannot but be linked up with politics. 
 
 There are three significant things of note from Lenin’s speech. Firstly, this form of 
political socialisation is overt and conscious. Secondly, the extent to which we may consider 
this process as sinister or oppressive depends largely on our perspective of the regime. Lenin 
and the Bolshevik Party believed they were working in the ‘real’ interests of working people 
and that political education was essential to ensuring that people realized their true interests. 
In other words, the Russian Empire’s subjects’ emancipation laid not with the old order, but 
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with revolutionary zeal of the Bolshevik party. Therefore, depending upon your perspective, 
one can ask if there is a difference between the benign and malign forms of political 
socialisation. What might be socialisation for one person may be indoctrination for others. 
Both forms imply the formal and deliberate education of individuals. Individuals learn to 
conform to the prevailing norms and values of the particular system. As much as Lenin 
sought to engineer society to socialist norms, could it also be the case that citizens in liberal 
democratic systems are socialised to believe that democracy is the best form of government 
and capitalism, predicated on wealth creation over social equality, is the best type of 
economic system? 
  
The political philosopher Herbert Marcuse considered this question in his book One 
Dimensional Man (1960) in which he critiqued both capitalism and the communist system in 
the Soviet Union. He argued that capitalism, in what he termed ‘advanced industrial 
societies’, creates social and political conformity whereby individuals are indoctrinated into 
the existing system of production and consumption via mass media, advertising, technology 
and the dominant modes of thought. For Marcuse, this portends to a form of social control. 
On the surface it might seem like we have freedom, but underneath the available choices are 
constrained and the public space for critical thought is limited. No doubt there are problems 
with Marcuse’s thesis, not least in its failure to explain reactions against global capitalism 
which reared their head in 1968 and which can still be seen more recently, for example in 
cases such as the Occupy Movement, which emerged in response to the global financial crisis 
of 2008, and the electoral success of left-wing parties in Europe. For example, SYRIZA in 
Greece which won the 2015 parliamentary election in the country, or Podemos in Spain, 
which obtained 20 percent of the vote in the December 2015 national elections. Nonetheless, 
Marcuse’s argument does urge us to challenge our assumptions regarding the underlying 
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norms of the political system in which we are socialised into. Moreover, it is important to 
recognize that how we understand political socialisation can depend on very different ways of 
looking at the world.  
 
Thirdly, Lenin’s speech highlights that often in situations such as revolutions incoming 
elites require citizens to ‘unlearn’ old political values, traditions and habits. Sometimes this 
process of re-education is enforced through brutal indoctrination, as in the case of the Khmer 
Rouge regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia in the 1970s. Similarly, ISIS’ destruction of cultural 
sites in Palmyra and throughout Syria is an attempt ‘to annihilate the local sense of 
belonging, and the collective sense of memory among local communities’ to establish a new 
set of cultural values and impose its own vision regarding history and heritage (Harmanşah 
2015). Nevertheless, as we noted above in relation to political indoctrination, any shift in 
patterns of socialisation is likely to encounter the legacy of old patterns.  
 
Research on transitions from communism to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 
points to the important legacies of communist rule in shaping post-communist politics across 
the continent. This was especially the case with regards to the survival and success of 
Communist Parties in new democratic environments (Grzymala-Busse 2002) which suggests 
that voter preferences for the politics of the old Communist order were harder to eradicate 
than first thought. There were concerns from the outset that in the ‘new’ democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe there would be an erosion of support for democracy and the neo-
liberal economic reforms taking place (Przeworski 1991). In one country, at least, such 
apprehension was prescient. Contemporary politics in Hungary has been marked by the rise 
of a so-called illiberal democracy which has featured the concentration of power in the 
hands of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz (Innes 2015). No doubt any 
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‘illiberal turn’ is marked by the effects of the 2008 global recession. Research by The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development found that in the aftermath of the 2008 
economic crisis public support for democracy and the market economy had fallen in Hungary 
and other former Communist countries which are now members of the European Union 
(Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Poland) (Grosjean, Ricka and 
Senik 2013). The findings illustrate that support for democracy and the market economy are 
sensitive to the contingency of business cycles and also it reveals the shallow roots of 
democratic culture in Hungary and other Central East European states which were planted 
after the collapse of communism.  
Key Word: Illiberal Democracy is a form of governing system in which elections do take 
place, but general civil liberties and effective pluralism are limited. Key institutions of the 
state which typically offer oversight of government policies in democracies are constrained in 
illiberal democracies via the appointment of government friendly officials.  Large portions of 
the public space and the media are also controlled by government friendly agencies.   
 
What the case of Hungary demonstrates is that we should be wary of jumping to 
premature conclusions in political science. While there are those who would seek to re-
socialise populations, whether in non-democratic regimes, or for those systems undergoing a 
transition to market economies and liberal democratic politics as in post-communist Europe, 
old political attitudes and orientations are hard to remove and can appear to intervene in 
unpredictable ways.  
 
Think point 
 What do you think of the distinction between benign and malign forms of political 
socialisation? 
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 Why do you think it is difficult for citizens to ‘unlearn’ old attitudes, values and 
norms in states which are transitioning from non-democratic to democratic rule? 
 
3.4 What do we learn? 
So far, we have considered the purpose of political socialisation in the forms of civic 
education and indoctrination. What we need to turn our attention to now is the content of that 
political socialisation. Broadly speaking what we learn through the process of political 
socialisation whether in democratic or non-democratic systems can be absorbed into three 
categories: attachment to political institutions, partisanship; and participation.  
 
Attachment to the political system 
 Political socialisation emerged as a sub-field of political science as part of the boom in 
Behaviouralism of the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the most prominent studies in this period 
explored how through childhood political socialisation practices in the United States, children 
became attached to government, institutions and political personalities. Easton (1965 cited in 
Sears 1975) differentiates three objects of attachment. The first relates to an attachment to the 
broader political community within which individuals find themselves situated. In essence we 
learn very early on in childhood that we belong to a particular ‘national’ community. This is 
elicited through both a conscious and unconscious process. Consciously, from an early age 
we are made aware of the symbols of nationhood, the flag, national anthem, and key 
personnel such as monarchs, presidents and prime ministers. We learn that these are symbols 
and persons who represent a bounded community group with which ‘we’ belong too. The 
most obvious example is in the United States where at least half of the States require children 
to recite the pledge of allegiance.  
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Key Word: Behaviouralism A movement in post-war political science, notably in the USA, 
concerned with establishing law-like generalisations about the political world and with 
shifting the emphasis of political studies away from its traditional legal-institutional 
manifestation. With a focus on individual behaviour, the ‘behavioural approach’ means 
literally a focus upon individual behaviour. The ‘behavioural approach’ is linked with 
quantitative research techniques designed to generate testable hypotheses about measurable 
attitudes and observable behaviour, thus rendering the study of politics more scientific.  
 
Pledge of Allegiance of the United States (1954 current version) 
“I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for 
which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” 
 
At the same, time we are subject to unconscious socialisation towards national symbols. This 
is what Michael Bilig (1995) termed banal nationalism which concerns the everyday and 
routine ‘flagging’ of the nation by way of sporting events, national songs, routine words and 
phrases, currency, television and media representation of the national community. Just 
consider how international competitive sporting events, such as the Olympics, fosters a sense 
of attachment to the national community. Of course, not all early attachments are to a 
‘national’ community. It is important to recognize that individuals can learn attachment to 
other identities such as religion, ethnicity, class and gender.  
 
Key Word: Banal Nationalism Is the idea of every day representations of nationalism 
within democratic states. Banal nationalism represents the ideological daily habits of 
nationalism which more often than not go unnoticed such as the flag standing in the 
background, the portrait hanging of the wall, and the use of terms such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ in 
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national media. Banal nationalism is the continual flagging of the ‘nation’ in the background 
of daily life through political discourse, cultural products and news media. 
 
The second object of attachment which is part of our political learning concerns the 
particular system we are socialised into. This could be a liberal democracy, authoritarian 
regime, monarchy or any other type of polity. According to Sears (1975: 114), from a young 
age we become accustomed to the specific constitutional order, ‘including political roles and 
institutions and the rules and norms for handling matters politically’. In other words, we 
begin to understand the specific mechanisms through which power is obtained and wielded. 
In a democratic system this would concern learning about elections and political parties. In 
our earlier examples of Turkmenistan and North Korea this might instead focus on learning 
about and developing an attachment to the personality cults of President Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov and Kim Jong un.  
 
 The third object of attachment are particular occupants of authority roles. We learn in 
school from an early age the names and personalities of leading political figures and we 
understand that they are imbued with political authority. We also learn of important figures 
throughout history. In the US, school children are taught very early on about the important 
role of ‘great’ presidents such as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, while in the UK, 
school children are taught of the important role of Winston Churchill during the Second 
World War. Feminists would critique the fact that often absent from these historical 
venerations of specific public figures of authority are women. 
 
Partisanship 
 A key research finding in many studies of political socialisation is that children often 
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acquire political partisanship from their parents. The correlation between parental and child 
political preferences and attitudes is observed to be strong (Jennings & Niemi, 1968). Studies 
have consistently showed that political orientations such as party identification and political 
ideology are transmitted between generations (Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb 1991; Jennings 
and Niemi 1982; Mattei and Niemi 1991). For example, Jennings (1984) illustrated how 
parents can affect the particular ideological orientation of their offspring on the left-right 
spectrum. Therefore, a child might follow their parents’ political orientation towards a 
particular political party. The assumption is if parents supports a Socialist Party then the child 
will develop a preference for a Socialist Party too.  
 
The question, however, is what causes such reproduction of partisanship? A recent 
(Quintelier, Hooghe and Badescu 2007) comparative study of data from Belgium, Canada 
and Romania found that there were three broad causal mechanisms: the active promotion of 
values and attitudes by parents; parents positioned as ‘role models’; and transmission via 
socio-economic status. The research found that greater interaction within the family and 
families with a higher economic status were more effective in promoting intergenerational 
partisan political orientations. Moreover, the evidence of the study suggested 
intergenerational partisanship is more stable in established democracies such as Canada and 
Belgium than it is in emerging democracies such as Romania.  
  
This is where the issue of context is crucial. The fact is there is variability in the extent to 
which parents affect political partisanship within their off-spring. This variability can depend 
not just upon the type of political system, but also different parenting styles (Murray and 
Mulvaney 2012) and in the case of democracies the type of party system. As Ventura (2001: 
686) has examined in the case of the European party systems, in two-party systems, parents 
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usually convey to their children their party identification; in competitive multiparty systems 
there is a transmission of ideological identification along the left-right axis; and in 
competitive multiparty systems with several cross-cutting cleavages, parents tend to diffuse 
an identification with a bloc of parties, sharing a common denominator in terms of one of the 
cleavages. 
 
 What the above alludes to is that how we learn political partisanship is complex and can 
be dependent upon many different contextual factors. A problem with the idea of inter-
generational transmission of party and ideological orientation is that it cannot explain change 
or variability of party or ideological identification over time. Is it really the case that what we 
politically learn from our parents sticks over the long-term? Or are we subject to more 
important influences over our life cycle? This is a central question we will return to below 
when considering the question of when we become political socialised.  
 
Participation 
 The final category of our political learning is participation. The process of political 
socialisation introduces us to the expectations placed upon us as citizens of the broader social 
group to play an active role in the political process. In democratic systems we learn about 
elections and parties and therefore the important function voting has for the working of the 
democratic process. In democracies participation is ‘an opportunity to communicate 
information to government officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure 
on them to respond’ (Verba, Lehman Schlozman and Brady 1995: 37). As we will see in the 
following chapters, however, participation is not just limited to voting. Given we understand 
politics in this book in a broad sense which correlates with the idea of power and its 
underpinning relationships, then political participation can take many forms. The same goes, 
22 
 
therefore, for the different types of political participation we can learn through the process of 
political socialisation. Aside from voting, the extent to which we are involved in political 
activism, whether campaigning for a party, standing for election, attending a protest or a 
march, donating money to a political campaign and even getting involved in political 
discussions via social media forums such as Facebook and Twitter, can largely depend on the 
context of our political learning. For example, Ellen Quintelier (2015) found in the case of 
Belgium that children’s propensity to participate in political activity in later life is mediated 
by the extent to which they grew up in an active political family and come from a higher 
socio-economic group.   
 
This section has provided us with an insight to some of the research which explains what 
we learn through the process of political socialisation. By learning attachment, partisanship 
and participation as individuals we develop a palette of norms, values and attitudes which 
underpin our political orientation to the social world. However, as we have noted above the 
intensity and longevity of what we learn can depend on the specific context and it raises a 
fundamental question concerning when we become politically socialised. If it is the case that 
parental influence is important in explaining long-term partisanship and participation, then 
we would think that early years socialisation is crucial. However, that does not account for 
elements of change within our individual political orientation. The following section explores 
this issue.  
 
3.5 When do we become politically socialised? 
 
The when question has been a matter of lively debate in the literature on political 
socialisation. Dennis Kavanagh labels the two sides of the debate the primacy and recency 
23 
 
schools. The titles are suggestive of the emphasis given to the crucial period of political 
socialisation. Adherents of the primacy school emphasise the importance of childhood (and 
early childhood in particular), whereas analysts from the recency perspective point to the 
importance of the ongoing socialisation and re-socialisation processes that occur throughout 
life. However, it is important to remember that this is more than simply a debate about when 
political learning takes place. It is sometimes forgotten that the primacy and recency schools 
are based upon very different assumptions and thus represent thoroughly different ways of 
thinking about the world in general and human learning in particular. 
 
Primacy theory draws upon a branch of psychology that places emphasis upon the 
centrality of the early years to individual development. The key concept of the ‘critical 
period’ becomes useful here. The argument is that the brain is best equipped for the receipt of 
certain sorts of information at certain critical (or ‘sensitive’) periods in early childhood. 
Studies of language acquisition reveal that it is extremely difficult for a person to learn basic 
linguistic skills in the period beyond childhood. This is believed to be because children are 
physiologically and psychologically ready to respond to external stimuli in ways that lead 
them to obtain the knowledge and skills associated with language. So, individuals are likely 
to be socialised to certain sorts of key political information in a critical period in early 
childhood, probably in the environment provided by immediate family and guardians. 
Obviously, infants and young children will not have the mental equipment to develop fully 
formulated opinions on the pressing political issues of the day; neither will they arrive at 
sophisticated notions of voting preference. The argument of primacy theorists is that the sorts 
of values which are embedded in the early stages of childhood ‘kick in’ during later life as 
the individual becomes acquainted with the public world of politics. 
 
24 
 
In contrast, recency approaches to political socialisation are built around the view that 
political learning is an ongoing process related to changing experiences throughout the life 
cycle. This position draws on psychological studies of identity formation which suggest that 
self-definition and self-understanding are subject to change. In particular, there is a sense in 
which the development of a ‘mature’ identity involves the rejection of earlier influences. In 
terms of political learning, the argument appears to be that the results of socialisation are 
never fully embedded, that changing circumstances can produce crises of political identity 
and re-socialisation into new habits, norms and beliefs. 
 
Think point 
Think about your own experience of politics. 
■ Which of the two frameworks outlined above, ‘primacy’ or ‘recency’, seems best placed 
to explain your political socialisation? 
 
Both positions have been supported by empirical research. The first classic study in this area 
was Herbert Hyman’s Political Socialization (Hyman 1959). Hyman’s data appeared to 
support the claim that children in the United States tended to acquire the political preferences 
of their parents. This could be taken as evidence of the transmission of political values in 
childhood. In their research reported in Children and the Political System David Easton and 
Jack Dennis (1969) studied the acquisition of political values in childhood. They concluded 
that childhood political socialisation occurred as a four-stage process in which children 
learned about authority. In the first stage children would recognise that certain individuals 
were somehow endowed with authority. So, a parent would be able to stipulate bedtime, or a 
police officer would be able to arrest miscreants. Second, children would realise that 
authority has both public and private faces. At this stage it would become apparent that the 
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type of authority exercised by the parent is qualitatively different from that of the police 
officer. In the third stage children would recognise that authority can be embedded in 
institutions such as governments, parliaments and courts. The final and most sophisticated 
stage would occur at the point when children understood that institutions have an existence 
that is separate from the individuals who work within them. 
 
The third and fourth stages in the Easton and Dennis model constitute recognition of what 
is commonly understood to be the political world: the domain of authoritative institutions. 
What is interesting is that Easton and Dennis understand the process of learning about politics 
as beginning prior to a formal understanding of politicians, parties, parliaments and so on. 
From this viewpoint it is not necessary to be able to understand oneself in relation to 
‘political’ objects in order to be socialised politically. Moreover, what is learned early 
matters: 
 
What enters the mind first remains there to provide lenses and categories for perceiving 
and sorting later perceptions. Furthermore, early learning occurs during the period of 
plasticity and openness: the assumptions acquired in childhood frequently appear to be 
absorbed in an unquestioned fashion. Such assumptions can become inarticulate major 
premises which then exercise a background effect on thought and overt behaviour 
precisely because they are not made sufficiently conscious to become open to challenge. 
(Greenstein et al. 1970, cited in Kavanagh 1983: 45) 
 
A problem with the primacy school is that it largely ignores adult socialisation. The 
political socialisation we are subject to in childhood may not necessarily equip us with the 
values and attitudes to meet the challenges of political decision making in adult life. As 
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individuals we undergo many personal changes and unexpected events throughout our life 
and it is important to recognize how our political outlook can change when we adapt to new 
(political) environments. The emphasis within the recency school, therefore, is on how our 
identities develop and evolve over time in response to different political and social stimuli: 
  
“Lifelong socialisation becomes a cumulative process whereby the individual is able to 
adapt existing knowledge and behaviour to new situations. A bank of social values, 
attitudes and actions is built up and the social actor can draw on them in combination to 
suit the needs of changing role situations”  
                  (White 1977, cited in Rush 1992: 100) 
  
As Roberta S. Sigel (1989) has noted, a good way of thinking about adult socialisation is 
in terms of chronological age. There are certain political activities which we can only 
undertake once we are adults such as voting or running for office. At the age of three we do 
not have the cognitive capacity to engage in such meaningful political behaviour, thus we 
require additional political learning to perform such activities as voting, campaigning or even 
becoming a politician. Our political learning therefore continues into adulthood. Our political 
preferences will also shift with age too. As a 20-year old we might possess policy preferences 
based on fair access to university education, career development and opportunities to get on 
the housing ladder, but as a 65-year old our policy preferences may be more directed towards 
issues such as the age of retirement and social care. It is reflective of psychological research 
which shows that people act in self-interest when their stake in a particular policy is clear and 
when they understand the benefits a particular policy might bring for them personally 
(Chong, Citrin and Conley 2001). 
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Changing circumstances such as university education, marriage, different work 
environments and unexpected contingent events can shape and re-define an individual’s 
political consciousness. It is not just a case of political socialisation, but re-socialisation to 
different norms and values, and perhaps even de-socialisation, the un-learning of existing 
views and attitudes. This raises fundamental questions about what we retain and what do we 
change, and why and with what effects? Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the recency 
approach is to consider personal biographies of lifelong political socialisation in action.  
 
In his 2016 book Exit Right: The People Who Left the Left and Re-Shaped the American 
Century, Daniel Oppenheimer details the political journeys of six figures in American politics 
who adapted their political attitudes from the left to the right of the political spectrum and in 
doing so had a profound effect on American political life. A notable case is that of 
Christopher Hitchens who was a public intellectual. Hitchens formative political years where 
in the counter culture movement of the 1960s. In the febrile atmosphere of the time, Hitchens, 
influenced by Marxism and the ideas of the New Left, attended protests and demonstrations 
against US involvement in Vietnam. For three decades he was a leading public voice on 
political issues and causes of the left and was a self-described Trotskyist. However, by the 
2000s Hitchens political world view had changed and he became an advocate of US president 
George W. Bush’s neoconservative agenda especially in relation to his support for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Hitchens suggested that his change in political outlook was driven by a 
series of on-going political events including the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the failure of 
the international community to respond to the Bosnian-Serb genocide and the Rwandan 
genocide, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001, and 
Saddam Hussein’s treatment of the Kurdish population. Hitchens shift from left to right 
demonstrates the complex relationship between earlier held values and how they might 
28 
 
influence a revision in political outlook in later life. It is clear from the above that while the 
contingent events of Salmon Rushdie’s fatwa and 9-11 precipitated an ideological shift from 
left to right, Hitchens also suggested that this shift could be detected in his earlier objection 
when on the left to all things totalitarian. For Hitchens, therefore, his political journey from 
arch-Trotskyist to neoconservative was entirely consistent with long-held beliefs regarding 
opposition to dictatorship and the anti-democratic nature of fascism, which for him was 
reflected in contemporary Islamic fundamentalism. This is reflective of the interactive 
relationship between early and adult political socialisation. As David Marsh (1971: 458) has 
noted ‘attitudes in later socialisation may indeed be more significant than has been realized. 
However, attitudes which developed at an early age might still be the most stable over time 
shaping and influencing the perception of those later attitudes.  
 
What Christopher Hitchens case alerts us to is how contingency and major political 
events can be catalysts for political socialisation (Sears and Valentino 1997). Research on the 
impact of the events of the terrorist attacks of 9-11 on the political behaviour of victims’ 
families is very revealing in this respect.  Eitan Hersh traced the families of 1729 victims of 
9-11 to examine if or how their political activities changed since the event compared to a 
similar (control) group of New York residents not directly affected by the attacks on the Twin 
Towers. His research produced two central findings. Firstly, families and neighbours of 
victims became more involved in politics after the attack including being more likely to vote, 
to be more involved in the selection of party candidates and to provide more financial support 
to favoured candidates. Secondly, while families, and to a lesser extent neighbours, became 
more involved in party activities, there was also a shift in allegiance to the Republican Party 
(Hersh 2013). Over a 12-year period Hersh found that family members of victims were 5 
percent less likely to be members of the Democratic Party. What Hersh’s research does not 
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tell us is why families of victims shifted to the right – it could have been because they were 
impressed with how Republican President George Bush dealt with the aftermath of the 
attacks or an increased policy preference for issues of domestic security, something which the 
conservative Republican Party has reputation for protecting. Nevertheless, as Hersch notes 
‘9/11 catalysed long-lasting political changes among those most affected’, and this serves to 
exemplify the way in which large-scale contingent events can re-socialise adults’ political 
norms and values.  
 
Think Point 
 Consider a major event which has altered your behaviour and perspective towards 
political issues.  
 How did it impact you? How might the event have contributed towards changing your 
political outlook? 
 
Primacy and recency identify different stages and processes important to the attainment of 
political identity. Differently put, it is not the case that one school of thought is right or 
wrong, both reflect different periods when we learn about politics. Some values may stick in 
early life – while other may shift in relation to changes in our lives. Neither has a complete 
explanation for political socialisation. Primacy can be a useful theoretical lens for analysing 
political partisanship and voter alignment over time. More precisely, the extent to which 
parental preference and social class can determine our party preference. For example, in their 
landmark study of electoral choice in Britain in the 1960s, Butler and Stokes (1969, cited in 
Rush 1992) found there was a high correlation between the party their survey respondents 
voted for and the party preferences of their parents. Recency, however, can help explain de-
partisanship and voter de-alignment which represents a ‘partial uncoupling of the association 
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between party preference and class’ (Rush 1992: 105). Greater social and geographic 
mobility and the exposure of more economic opportunities can potentially alter our policy 
preferences leading people to switch party allegiance.  
 
3.6 How do we learn about politics? 
Implicit in our discussions so far are some of the different agents of socialisation who 
can shape our political orientations. We have seen earlier on in this chapter that that family 
are perceived to have a long-term effect on the political partisanship of their offspring. Much 
early research on political socialisation of the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the role of parents 
as social agents in shaping the political attitudes of their children. Education and schooling is 
also important, as we saw with the deliberate political socialisation in the cases of 
Turkmenistan and North Korea. But education has an important role in democratic societies 
too, as we saw with civic education programmes. And as we have just observed how 
contingent events such as the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 can have an influence 
on our political attitudes over the longer-term.  
 
Key Word: Agents of socialisation Those individuals, groups or institutions which are 
responsible for the transmission of the information through which people acquire their 
socialisation 
 
 There are many agents of socialisation we could point to which might shape the 
norms and values we hold. We might look at the socialising impact of gender, workplace, 
social class, peer groups, leisure activities or membership of religious groups. One agency 
worthy of deeper investigation here is popular culture and mass media. Popular culture can be 
understood to range from books, television shows, music, films, the Internet, radio, video 
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games and of course print media (newspapers and magazines). For the purposes of this 
discussion, we will attend briefly to the socialising role played by books and films.  
 
 On the surface, popular culture can often seem disposable and lacking in substantive 
political content. Yet, culture and stories are very powerful mediums with which to transmit 
ideas, values and norms about society. The question is can such representation of values and 
norms through popular culture shape our political outlook and behaviour? Recent research 
suggests there is indeed a correlation between popular culture and certain political attitudes. 
Anthony Gierzynski has produced empirical evidence to demonstrate how the Harry Potter 
series has influenced the political values and outlook of the millennial generation. Gierzynski 
(2013: 6) carried out a national survey of 1100 college students in the United States and 
found that those who had read the books had a proclivity ‘towards greater levels of 
acceptance for out-groups, higher political tolerance, less predisposition to authoritarianism, 
greater support for equality, are less cynical, and possess greater opposition to the use of 
violence and torture’. All in all, Gierzynski found that those who had grown up with and read 
the Harry Potter series were more liberal. 
 
 Gierzynski and his colleagues conducted further research on the influence of the 
Television programmes Game of Thrones and House of Cards. Gierzynski notes that a key 
theme of both shows is the concept of justice, or more precisely lack of justice. Anyone who 
has watched Game of Thrones knows that any character who is characterised as morally 
‘good’ will unlikely last until the end of the season, typically perishing in some violent and 
gory way at the hands of the less moral, or at least morally ambiguous, characters. The show, 
therefore, possesses a tendency to reward injustice. Netflix’s House of Cards is very similar 
in this respect. Kevin Spacey’s character Frank Underwood is a cynical, lying and 
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manipulative US senator who will resort to any means necessary, including murder, to 
achieve his goal of becoming president. Conducting a survey of 1003 of college students 
Gierzynski et al (2015: 37) found that audiences of these shows scored lower in believing in a 
‘just world’, in other words they have a tendency to see the world as cruel and unjust. They 
also scored higher in believing that ends justify the means, and in the case of House of Cards, 
a propensity towards cynicism about government. The implication of these findings is that as 
consumers of media we have a tendency to see the world as it is presented through media 
representations (Shrum and Lee 2012). In psychology this process is called transportation – 
whereby narratives can influence beliefs (Green and Brock 2000). Research has suggested 
that transportation has occurred in relation to the influence of Oliver Stone’s 1991 film JFK, 
which details a conspiracy theory implicating the CIA in the assassination of President John 
F. Kennedy. A Gallup poll found that in 1992 75 percent of US citizens believed there to 
have been a conspiracy in the murder of JFK, an increase on previous years polling, a fact the 
polling company put down to the influence of Oliver Stone’s film (Gallup 2001). 
 
Think Point 
 Consider if there are any forms of popular culture which have shaped your political 
outlook. What values might they have promoted? Did they change or confirm existing 
political attitudes you held? 
 What do you think are the weaknesses of popular culture as an agent of political 
socialisation?  
 What are the limitations of using popular culture as a tool to study political 
socialisation? 
 
 As political scientists we should always cast a critical eye over such research findings as 
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above. Indeed, we should treat the relationship between the influence of popular culture texts 
such as Harry Potter or Game of Thrones with caution. The first thing we should note is that 
all these findings point toward correlation not causation. In other words, while they may be a 
statistical link between students reading Harry Potter and possessing more liberal views, it 
does not mean that reading J.K. Rowling’s book series causes students to be more tolerant 
and liberal. As David Jackson has noted, survey research which draws a correlation between 
popular culture preferences and political beliefs produces a mixed-bag of results which 
cannot always easily be made sense of (Jackson 2008: 27). For example, Jackson conducted a 
survey of 456 young Anglophone Canadians on the influence of rock star Bono’s political 
views on their beliefs and he found that while young Canadians respected his views there was 
no evidence that Bono’s political outlook specifically shaped or caused those views (Jackson 
2007). Second, any choice of entertainment we consume may reflect our pre-existing beliefs 
and prejudices. Therefore, we might seek out particular forms of popular culture because they 
confirm our existing political beliefs. We might watch Oliver Stone’s JFK because we have 
predilection to conspiracy theories. House of Cards might appeal to us because it confirms 
pre-held views we possess regarding the cynical nature of politicians and government.  The 
third issue we should be cautious about is whether it is simply the case, as implied by this 
research and the notion of ‘transmission’, that we are passive receivers of media messages? 
The research tends to assume that we arrive at these forms of popular culture without prior 
political knowledge, beliefs and ideas. As individuals we have agency to negotiate the 
messages we receive through the media and to draw out fact from fiction. We develop our 
political outlook not from any single source and neither just from sources of entertainment. In 
other words, we arrive at a position whereby we are not just passive receivers of messages 
but as activate participants who balance competing messages from varying sources and who 
possess agency in sifting through such sources to develop our outlook on the political world.  
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 Culture has also been an important tool of political socialisation in non-democratic 
systems. The most obvious example would be the use of cinema as a propaganda tool by the 
Soviet elites in the early days of the USSR as they sought to educate the masses into new 
patterns of social, economic and political behaviour. The silver screen was used to spread the 
Soviet’s ideological message and was dragooned to offer an idealised portrayal of the values 
of the Russian Revolution and heroism of the proletariat. Film was especially useful in the 
areas of the former Russian Empire which were perceived to be more ‘backward’ and 
‘primitive’ such as the Central Asian region (modern day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). This area did not have an established cinema 
network so to reach these populations the Soviet authorities established travelling cinemas 
which would go from region to region showing the latest kul’turfil’my (cultural films). These 
were short documentary films which were used to demonstrate the civilizing nature of the 
new Soviet authorities. One of the most widely known of such films was the 1929 
documentary film Turksib directed by Viktor Turin. Turksib was aimed at promoting one of 
the successes of the first five-year plan, the construction of the Turkestan-Siberian railway. 
Films such as Turksib were a crucial tool for the Soviet authorities as they sought to gain 
power and control over Central Asia. The visuals of cinema were fundamental to promoting a 
positive message of the Soviet authorities’ intentions and activities in the region, not least 
because many of the different ethnic groups in Central Asia did not have a standardized form 
of written language.  
 
However, it is important to question the lasting power of such media messages. Despite 70 
years of cinema, media, literature and other cultural forms pumping out the values and norms 
of communist propaganda, the Soviet regime still collapsed in 1991. It does raise questions 
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regarding the effectiveness of culture in shaping political values and attitudes. In the case of 
the Soviet Union, by the 1970s and 1980s there was a gap between the artistically imagined 
political and social life of the state as presented in film and other cultural mediums, and the 
lived day-to-day experiences of Soviet citizens. At the same time, however, cinema became a 
medium for subtle dissent against the Soviet system. The 1970s in Soviet cinema saw the 
emergence of so-called bvtovy (slice-of-life) films which sought to depict the ‘real’ day-to-
day life and problems of Soviet citizens. Anna Lawton notes how Sergei Mikaelian’s 1975 
film the Bonus is a good example of such cinema. The film tells the tale of how a factory 
supervisor challenges the falsification of the over-fulfilment of planned targets and 
consequently rejects a financial bonus. In the movie, while the Communist Party officials 
support the supervisor, the film in fact depicts the corruption and inefficiencies which were 
systemic in the planned Soviet economy (Lawton 1992: 11). It would be a stretch to claim 
that this type of subtle political dissent through popular Soviet culture shaped political 
attitudes to such an extent that it contributed significantly to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
But what it does illustrate is that popular culture can act to challenge prevailing political and 
social norms whether in a non-democratic or democratic system.   
 
This discussion on the role of popular culture as an agent of socialisation illustrates how a 
less obvious social agent can influence or shape our political beliefs. However, we should be 
cautious about the extent of its influence and instead see it as part of the panoply of 
influencing agents such as family, school and peers. Popular culture, like other agents, may 
precipitate or re-confirm our existing views. Ultimately, it can depend on personal 
experience. 
 
3.7 The importance of political socialisation 
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The study of political learning or political socialisation is not an insulated discrete topic. That 
much should already be clear. To conclude this chapter, it is worth addressing three particular 
questions about the wider implications of political socialisation for, respectively, political 
science, politics and the political system. 
 
What does political socialisation tell us about political science? 
 
Why did political scientists become interested in socialisation? This is worthy of some 
extended discussion. Anyone who has seriously thought about politics would have 
contemplated either the relationship between political learning and political action or the way 
in which types of regime might be underpinned by certain sorts of formal or informal 
socialisation. We have seen that these ways of thinking go back at least as far as ancient 
Greece. But political socialisation as a concept emerged very much in the environment of 
political science in the United States during the 1950s. 
 
As most commentators acknowledge, the appearance of political socialisation as a serious 
subject of empirical enquiry was bound up with the so-called behavioural revolution in 
political science. In this viewpoint of behaviouralism the main purpose of political, and for 
that matter social, science is the explanation of individual and collective behaviour. As David 
Sanders puts it, ‘[t]he central question that behaviouralists ask is: “Why do individuals, 
institutional actors and nation states behave in the way that they do?”’ (Sanders 1995: 74). 
Framing the problematic of enquiry in this way suggests that behaviouralists are interested in 
establishing patterns of causation.  
 
Furthermore, behaviouralists insist that we must be able to observe behaviour and test 
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hypotheses empirically. The resulting body of empirical political theory will be open to 
verification or falsification. In other words, the behavioural movement was entangled with 
the quest to make the study of social phenomena more scientific. We have already addressed 
the question of whether or not the study of politics can be scientific in the Introduction to this 
book, and it might be worth thinking about that issue again. For behaviouralists, the 
accumulation of empirical data from observable political phenomena in pursuit of particular 
hypotheses could lead to the tantalising prospect of law-like generalisations about the 
political world. But it was not just that the results of research would be scientifically valid. 
Behaviouralists – like others of a positivist persuasion – also believed that the ways in which 
they devised and conducted research projects should aspire to operate in the manner of the 
natural sciences. 
 
The importance of political socialisation should be clear. If we are able to derive 
empirical generalisations about how, when and from whom people learn about politics, then 
we have a potentially powerful set of tools for explaining how people behave politically. In 
addition, because of the behaviouralist concentration upon what is readily observable, 
enquiries into political socialisation have tended to concentrate on measurable sources of 
political information such as school curricula or the mass media or research into the patterns 
of learning among children across time. 
 
Think Point 
■ What do you make of behaviouralist approaches to the study of politics? 
■ Do they have any obvious weaknesses? 
 
For its advocates, behaviouralism had a number of advantages over other forms of political 
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study. Perhaps the least controversial claim made on the approach’s behalf was that it 
widened the scope of political science. Behaviouralism, argue its champions, focused 
attention away from the traditionally legalistic study of political institutions and constitutions 
towards the political actions of real people in all levels of the political system. More 
contentiously, behaviour is treated as the single most important unit of analysis in the study 
of politics; more important than, for example, institutional rules or norms. Doing political 
science in this way was made possible by advances in research methods that employed large-
scale surveys amenable to sophisticated statistical analysis. Developments in computer 
hardware and software have made such techniques less burdensome on the researcher and 
enabled the collection and processing of enormous quantities of data. 
 
For its opponents, behaviouralism was a deeply flawed approach to the study of politics 
for two reasons. The first line of criticism is that behaviouralism is likely to produce work 
that is overtly empiricist. In other words, the tenets of behaviouralism are said to encourage 
the asinine accumulation of facts. Generalisations emerge once regularities begin to form 
within a mass of accumulated empirical data. For many social scientists this approach is 
wrong-headed because it neglects the importance of devising theoretical and conceptual 
categories prior to the accumulation and manipulation of data (Sartori 1970). What we get is 
a political science based on phenomena that are amenable to easy measurement rather than 
those that are of theoretical importance. Theories, runs the argument, are the only things we 
have to help us sort through the disordered mess of the social world so that we may ask 
meaningful questions and choose relevant data. Indeed, there are elements of the political 
world that cannot be counted or meaningfully quantified, suggesting that behaviouralists run 
the risk of missing out important elements of their explanations. 
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In his discussion of behaviouralism, Sanders (1995) argues that this tendency is likely to 
neglect potentially important explanations on the grounds that they may be difficult or 
impossible to organise. He points to studies of voting behaviour which have managed to 
achieve quite sophisticated analyses of individual motivations for voting based upon the 
interplay of various factors such as social background, ideological and party identification 
and economic perceptions. But there is no incorporation into voting studies of, for example, 
the ways in which individuals conceptualise themselves. As Sanders puts it, ‘it is very hard to 
envisage how the responses to such questions – given the difficulty of measuring those 
responses systematically – could ever be incorporated into formal analysis. As a result, they 
are largely excluded from the analytic frame’ (Sanders 1995: 66). 
 
The second and related point is that behaviouralist political science elevates the 
quantifiable and relegates the theoretical. Behaviouralist-influenced political scientists have a 
predisposition for measuring things. Data are valid if they can be measured. The other side of 
the coin is that data are not valid if they are not quantifiable. This betrays a rather contentious 
set of assumptions about the political world and how that world might be studied. For 
instance, many critics note that the pseudo-scientific bent of behaviouralism leads many 
researchers to neglect the fact that they themselves are actors in the social and political world 
that they seek to explain. Objectivity is not easily achieved. Of particular importance is the 
behavioural assumption that theory and observation can be separated. The researcher is 
portrayed as an objective onlooker who then builds empirical theory based upon what he or 
she has observed. But we can argue quite strongly that all observation is influenced by a pre-
existing theoretical position. Thus, how the researcher observes is likely to be subject to some 
sort of theoretical preconception. Indeed, the selection of what is to be observed is equally 
likely to be conditioned in the same way. This scientism is also accused of neglecting the 
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normative element of political enquiry. So-called value freedom is taken to be a good thing 
among behaviouralists, but the marginalisation of values also potentially side-lines the great 
questions of political philosophy – questions about rights, freedom, justice and so on. 
 
The use of powerful arguments of this sort by critics has led to the abandonment of much 
of the most zealous and positivistic behaviouralism. Having said that, behaviouralism is still 
one of the most influential components of contemporary political science. A behavioural 
emphasis is central to the study of elections and voting, perhaps the best-known and most 
publicised manifestation of the study of politics. 
 
In the context of this volume, behaviouralism is important, not only because it provides a 
good case study of a particular way of ‘doing’ political science, but also because of the 
content of this chapter and of Chapters 3 and 4. As we will see, it is not necessary to be a 
behaviouralist to study political behaviour. But it very difficult to understand the work that 
has been done on socialisation, political culture and political participation without a basic 
sense of what behaviouralist political science was all about. 
 
What does political socialisation tell us about politics? 
 
This can be stated with more brevity. As indicated above, the work done on political 
socialisation rather suggests that politics is a very broad-based activity, by no means confined 
to the world of formal political institutions. The study of political socialisation opens up the 
study of politics to both the analysis of political behaviour (how individuals and groups 
operate within the bounds set by institutions) and research into the factors lying behind 
political action. Moreover, one of the basic assumptions of much work on political 
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socialisation is the idea that orientations to political objects are the product of the 
mobilisation of other sorts of values which we may learn in other arenas, whether as a child 
watching a Disney film or as an adult confronting problems in the workplace. So, politics is 
not necessarily a separate sphere of human existence somehow apart from all other aspects of 
life. In many ways it is our life. 
 
What does political socialisation tell us about the political system? 
 
The study of political socialisation raises some intrinsically interesting questions about the 
ways in which individuals acquire their political views and their orientations towards political 
objects. However, it is also worth drawing out some rather bigger issues that will be 
developed and argued through in the course of the next few chapters. Most prominently, there 
is the matter of the relationship between what we learn about politics and the stability or 
otherwise of the political system within which we live. Is what we learn about politics, in 
terms of particular chunks of knowledge as well as deeper values, somehow supportive of the 
regime? On the other hand, might it be possible to learn and mobilise around dysfunctional or 
anti-regime values? 
 
Unfortunately, we will have to leave these questions hanging for now. In addition, you 
should not expect to have any clear-cut answers to this issue even by the time you have 
finished reading this book. Unfortunately, political science is never that simple, but 
eventually you should be able to address these questions with greater conceptual 
sophistication. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
42 
 
 
We all learn about politics, but not in ways that may be immediately obvious. How often do 
we think that a 6-year-old child sitting in a classroom, completing a writing exercise set by 
the teacher, is being socialised politically? When we sit down to watch a film, do we imagine 
that it may propagate certain sets of values that reinforce or clash with our own? Of course, 
there is considerable dispute about whether either of these examples should be understood as 
an instance of the acquisition of political values and norms. Much depends upon what we 
think politics is all about and what we regard as politically relevant knowledge. The great 
advantage of studying socialisation is that it raises these difficult questions. With any luck, in 
so doing it makes us less complacent about the subject we study. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 Learning about politics is not just about acquiring formal knowledge about the 
workings of a political system. Rather, it is a matter of developing core values and 
attitudes as well as perceptions of authority that together influence political views and 
shape political behaviour. 
 Political scientists use the phrase ‘political socialisation’ to capture this process. 
 What we learn and how we learn about politics can depend on the wider political, 
social and economic context. 
 It is difficult to see how a regime could remain legitimate or stable without its 
subjects being socialised into sets of relevant norms. This may be viewed as a process 
of malign indoctrination or a benign form of civic education. 
 Debate rages as to whether the key processes of political socialisation occur within 
the early stages of a person’s life, or whether changing life experiences produce 
significant moments of re-socialisation. These two views may be usefully labelled the 
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‘primacy’ and ‘recency’ views. 
 Political socialisation takes place through different agents of socialisation, such as 
families, schools, peer groups, media and popular culture. 
 The study of political socialisation directs us towards some of the less formal aspects 
of the political process. Moreover, it is studied because some political scientists 
believe that patterns of socialisation into core societal values explain the ways in 
which different political systems work. 
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EXERCISE 
 
Write a short statement of between 500 and 1000 words reflecting on your own political 
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socialisation experiences. Putting these thoughts down on paper should be a valuable 
exercise; it will help you to see the connections between personal experience and the study of 
politics. Remember you will not be writing about your views on particular political issues. 
Rather, you should be thinking about where those views came from and the factors in your 
life which have had cause to influence or change your perspective on the political world. 
The following guidelines may be of help: 
 
1 What are my political views? Not just which political party do I support but how do I feel 
about broader issues; indeed, do I have any discernible political views? 
2 Can I identify any agents of socialisation that may have acted as formative political 
influences? Here we are talking about parents, teachers, friends as well as the media. 
3 At what points in my life do I think my key socialisation experiences occurred? 
Childhood, adolescence, adulthood? 
4 Have my views about politics changed over time? If so, do these changes reflect new 
socialisation experiences brought about in new environments (such as moving to a new 
area, changing schools or starting a new job)? 
 
 
 
 
